> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.orbit.devotel.io/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Synthetic-media provenance > How Orbit marks AI-generated voice and video output with a tamper-evident content credential: who mints it, what it binds to, where it travels, and how to verify it. # Synthetic-media provenance There are two places in Orbit where AI fabricates a human-sounding or human-looking asset: cloned **voice** and AI-avatar **video**. Every clip those surfaces produce carries a machine-readable **content credential** — a signed token any reviewer (a recipient, your compliance team, or a regulator) can check to confirm the clip is AI-generated. This page explains the model; request shapes live in the API reference pages linked below. ## What the credential is for A consent-registered voice clone in **Voice → Voice Clones** only gates the clone's *creation*. Once that clone synthesizes speech, or one of your avatar personas renders a video clip, the output bytes look no different from a human recording. The credential closes that gap: it proves, in a form a machine can check, "this clip was AI-generated by tenant T's clone or persona at a stated time." The motivation is regulatory direction — EU AI Act Article 50 (AI-generated content marking, binding 2026-08-02) and the FCC synthetic-voice rules — but the control belongs to you: the credential is minted on every eligible render whether or not your specific traffic requires it. The regulatory posture and your tenant-level opt-ins are in the [EU AI Act page](/compliance/eu-ai-act); this page is about how the marking mechanism works. ## The two sibling covers Two modality services mint credentials, built on one shared, stateless signing pipeline: * **Voice** — a ready clone id + synthetic speech. Every watermark request returns a token pairing the machine-readable manifest with your resolved spoken disclaimer (tenant-configured intro text or audio URL, falling back to Orbit's default "This message uses an AI-generated voice."). * **Video** — an avatar persona + async render job. When your render runtime reports `completed` on a `vavr_` render job, the transition handler mints the credential from the clip digest. Both sit on the same primitives: a `..` token signed with a purpose-separated HMAC-SHA256 subkey derived from the API secret — a leaked voice-watermark key never degrades the video key, JWT signing, or the API secret itself. Each modality owns its own manifest shape and key domain (voice tokens start `ov1`, video `ovv1`); the pipeline is shared. Verification is **stateless** — the token IS the record, so the credential capability shipped with zero schema migration. ## What gets bound to the clip The manifest inside each token binds three things: 1. **The exact clip bytes** — a lower-hex SHA-256 digest (`audio_sha256` for voice, `video_sha256` for video). Any edit to the clip after marking — re-encode, splice, partial lift — breaks the bind and verification reports a mismatch instead of passing. 2. **The generator identity** — the clone id (`vclone_…`) for voice, the persona id and render-job id for video. For video the manifest additionally binds the rendered script's digest, so the credential cannot be restapled to a clip saying something else. 3. **The declared disclosure** — a human-readable statement plus flags noting the mark satisfies the EU AI Act Article 50 synthetic-media obligation. A regulator reading the credential alone sees the declared basis without calling Orbit. ## Where the credential travels For **video**, the credential is persisted on the render job alongside its `output_url`, so when you attach that URL to a campaign send or a 1:1 MMS/WhatsApp message, the provenance travels with the clip. `GET /api/v1/video/avatar-video-renders/:id` returns the full job record, including the minted token. For **voice**, the credential is detached by design: you get the token back when you mark a clip, and you keep it with the clip wherever it goes. When you hand Orbit the actual audio bytes (not just a digest), the voice surface additionally embeds a C2PA content credential directly inside a WAV clip, so a C2PA-aware consumer can validate provenance without calling Orbit at all. ## Providers differ The detached token is provider-agnostic — the digest bind works regardless of which synthesis or render provider produced the clip. Other marks differ: * **In-audio watermarking** some TTS providers (ElevenLabs, Resemble) embed inside their output is a per-provider capability. Coverage varies by the configured voice provider, so treat it as an extra signal rather than a guaranteed layer. * **C2PA embedding in WAV bytes** is only possible when you pass the clip itself to the watermark endpoint — the digest-only path has no bytes to embed into. ## Verify in your hands Verification is a stateless POST — no client, no persistence: **Video:** ```bash theme={null} curl -X POST "https://api.orbit.devotel.io/api/v1/video/avatar-video-renders/verify" \ -H "X-API-Key: dv_live_sk_..." \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "token": "ovv1.." }' ``` Pass only the token to check its signature. Also pass the clip — as `video_base64` or a pre-computed `video_sha256` — and verify bind-checks it: a genuine token stapled onto different clip bytes reports `video_mismatch` instead of `ok`. **Voice:** the same idea on `POST /api/v1/voice/clones/:id/watermark` (mint) — read back the token and keep it with the clip. The render surface's `GET /api/v1/video/avatar-video-renders/:id` returns the minted token verbatim so you can hand it to a reviewer. ## See also * [EU AI Act — Article 50 transparency](/compliance/eu-ai-act) — the regulatory opt-ins, dossier export, and known limitations. * [AI video avatar agents](/guides/ai-video-avatar-agents) — the render workflow that these credentials mark. * [Create a voice clone](/guides/voice-clones) — the consent and enrollment steps before a clone can be watermarked. * [Video API reference](/api-reference/endpoints/video) — the render + verify request shapes.